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Abstract
Designers develop agent-based organizations with the goal to 
implement systems able to operate in complex environments. 
The distinctive quality of these systems is that agents are 
autonomous i.e. they can face complexity through their 
decision capabilities in order to make it more flexible. This 
paper proposes that the concept of complexity currently used 
in artificial intelligence is weak if compared with that 
elaborated in organizational sciences. As a result, current 
agent organizations cannot completely face all the range of 
complex situations. Borrowing some seminal contributions 
from organizational studies, a broader definition of 
complexity is presented introducing the notion of ambiguity, 
and its impact both on reasoning models and organizational 
design. Moreover, we present some major implications in the 
design of artificial systems and organizations.
Introduction
The analysis and development of an artificial system 
starts from the definition of those requirements that are 
needed in order to match its goals. A major and 
preliminary one is the definition of the level of 
environmental complexity it has to face, since such 
level has a direct impact on the complexity of the 
system. In fact, according to the principle of requisite 
variety, in order to be adaptable to its environment, a 
system has to accept an internal level of complexity 
positively correlated to the external one (Ashby 58). 
From this perspective, the complexity of task implies 
the complexity of the capability.
Of course, such statement seems quite obvious if we 
think about complexity in quantitative terms. For 
instance, if we think about complexity as the variety 
and variability of events, then increasing levels of 
complexity require to design systems made up of more 
various and variable components. But such conclusion 
is not obvious, since, as we will see, complexity can be 
of different qualities requiring, as a consequence, 
qualitatively different system’s modeling approaches. 
A qualitative jump of this kind has already occurred in 
the design of artificial systems. Is well known, in fact, 
how the passage from simple environments to complex 
ones, required to qualitatively step from a hierarchical 
design principle, to one that focuses on delegation. That 
is, more complexity could not be managed with more
complex hierarchies, while new organizational design 
principles where introduced, such as the one of 
autonomous and interacting components. In such case, 
the designer, instead of trying to recognize all the 
possible events that the system will face and implement 
ex-ante proper responses, he delegates their
identification and management directly to each system’s 
component. In the first approach the designer has the 
very tough mission to design an all-comprehensive 
solution foreseeing each possible state and behavior of 
each component. The second approach proposes that the 
system tries to manage complexity itself assigning goals 
to components, and delegating the modality of their 
execution. In this way, great importance assumes the 
concept of software agent and of goal oriented 
reasoning.
The intention of this new computational paradigm is to 
develop artificial organizations of software components 
able to face complex, dynamic and uncertain 
environments (Georgeff et al. 99). The distinctive 
quality of software agents is their autonomy, that is, the
ability of each agent to perform an endogenous
decisional process able to identify, run time, the best 
course of action (Barber and Martin 01). Thus, software 
agent organizations should be able to manage the gap 
between the complexity foreseen by the designer and 
the one faced in run time environments. Interestingly, 
such idea seems intuitively near to the notion of agency 
proposed in organization sciences by Arrow: the more 
the task is complex, the more it must be delegated to 
autonomous (human) agents (Arrow 85).
Again, if we where to think about complexity in 
quantitative terms, than if complexity increases, agents 
will have to be more autonomous in deciding courses of 
action. But, if we accept the possibility that there are 
qualitative different levels of complexity, then the 
question is whether there are other types of complex 
situations and, consequently, if current notions of agent, 
reasoning, and organization, are appropriate. Said 
differently, are artificial organizations designed on the 
principle of goal oriented agents able to qualitatively 
cope with all the possible ranges of complexity?
Going back to Arrow, such question seems to find a 
provoking answer if we consider that agency 
relationships are of different kinds depending on the 
complexity of the task. There are less complex tasks in 
which the principal can control the agent’s goals and 
behaviors (for example, manual execution), while there 
more complex types of relationships in which the 
principal can control just the goal level and not the 
execution level (for example, commercial activity). It is
easy to notice that the former seems quite near to the 
hierarchical design principle, while the latter to goal 
autonomous agents. However, as noted by Arrow, there 
are situations in which also the identification of goals 
must be delegated. In such cases, agents decide almost 
everything, putting under discussion the very notion of 
organization.
Such productive link between AI field and organization 
sciences, although originally vital in the famous work 
proposed by Herbert Simon, seems to be increasingly 
dry and forgotten (Simon 84). In fact, if we review AI 
literature, it seems quite evident that the last accepted 
notion of complexity refers to the one of uncertainty 
and, as a consequence, the last accepted model of goal 
oriented reasoning (or practical reasoning) refers to the 
one of bounded rationality and reasoning under 
uncertainty. Such circumstance is particularly 
unfortunate if we consider that after Simon, his major 
scholar, James March, started a whole new path in the 
analysis of complex situations and consequent rational 
models, aimed at overcoming the boundaries of 
uncertainty and address the qualitatively different 
notion of ambiguity (March and Olsen 1976; Zack 
1999). Nonetheless, such amnesia is perhaps due to a 
reasonable epistemological explanation; in Kuhnian 
terms (Kuhn 96), the concept of agent, rationality, and 
organization that emerges from March’s inquiry is 
seemingly incommensurable with that positivistic 
paradigm that still seems to entail AI research. In fact, 
as we will see afterwards, such passage is rather a 
qualitative jump than a quantitative improvement; it 
literary inverts our classic notion of what is a rational 
agent, and what an agents organization means.
As we believe that innovation lies in the explorative 
encounter of different systems of thinking, we’re 
definitively convinced that reestablishing some bridge 
among challenging organization science developments 
and AI, could be somehow a quite provoking and 
interesting experiment. As in the case of Arrow, 
organizational studies can bring into the AI field new 
and even ingenuous perspectives that could suggest 
unforeseen alternative ways to interpret traditional 
problems. At first, as cleverly said by Bowker and Star
(Bowker and Star 00), such exercise may generate 
“conceptual monsters” like the one here proposed of 
agents that before act, and afterwards seek for a 
plausible justification for their choice. Nonetheless, as it 
typically happens along scientific development (Di 
Trocchio 98), such “monsters” represent a boundary 
object upon which new concepts can be negotiated, 
developed, and than become “normal”. Goal of this 
paper is exactly to through into the AI field some 
organization science concepts that, due to their distance 
from the current paradigm, may hopefully be seen as 
“conceptual monsters”. As such, they are quite probably 
useless and unable to enhance concrete 
implementations. Nonetheless, if they are considered as 
they are, that is monsters, we believe they could 
generate some provocative reflection. 
In particular, we will focus on the sensemaking
approach to complex situations. The key issue of 
sensemaking is that it views complexity differently
from the classic notion used in AI. In fact, it views 
complexity not only in the sense of information’s lack 
(uncertainty), but rather in the sense of meaning’s lack 
(ambiguity). As a method to face this last notion of 
complexity, sensemaking defines a decision making 
approach radically different from that used in classic 
software agents systems. As a consequence, we will 
show how sensemaking and ambiguity entail a different 
perspective on the concept of organization. Finally, we 
propose some ideas on how these concepts may 
contribute to the development of artificial systems.
Current agent-based organizations 
paradigm
Current research in AI is focusing on the production of 
software able to make decisions in complex situations.
These systems are considered useful because, through 
their decision capabilities, they are able to handle that
part of complexity that could not be foreseen by the 
human designer. Several examples are used to display 
such systems but perhaps the most known is that of the 
air traffic controllers, i.e. the software controller 
systems responsible for the take-off, the landing of 
airplanes and, more in general, the management of an 
airport (Rao and Georgeff 95).
To better understand the capabilities of software agents,
it is useful to consider the notion of environmental 
complexity subsumed by such paradigmatic and so 
often cited example. Complex environments are those 
where there are (Russel and Norvig 95):
 Inaccessibility to updated information: there is a 
degree in which information is not available;
 Environmental indeterminacy: there is a degree in 
which actions have unpredictable effects;
 Interrelation of effects: different events can be 
influenced by other events;
 Environmental dynamicity: the environment change 
dynamically due to events independents form agent 
willingness;
 Discrete or continuous environment: the degree 
trough which environmental changes are considered 
is influenced by the quantity of information to 
consider.
Is to be underlined how, all these elements, entail a 
notion of environmental and organizational complexity 
in the sense of uncertainty. That is, information to make 
decision lacks or, on the contrary, there is so much 
information that the agent does not have the necessary 
storing and computational resources to effectively and 
efficiently process it. To face this kind of complexity,
software agents are designed according to the so called 
practical reasoning process, which is one of the most 
important decision making processes used in artificial 
intelligence (Bratman 87). In order to keep alive our 
linkage to organization sciences, such process finds its
root in one of the “ideal types” of rational behaviors
stated by the famous sociologist Max Weber (Weber 
78); that is, the ideal type of “instrumental rationality” 
now evolved into the notion of prospective rationality. 
This form of rationality notion, so similar to the 
practical reasoning model, was deeply analyzed in 
decision making theories, and it views choice as a 
process characterized as follows (March 94):
 There is a set of predefined (given) preferences. They 
state what is “good” and what is “bad” (evaluation 
criterion).  Preferences can be viewed as values used 
by an agent to judge and rank facts and events 
according to their desirability, and, as a consequence, 
to make decisions. Such preferences are by definition 
considered as given, that is, they are independent 
variables exogenous to the agent reasoning process 
(the agent doesn’t reason about preferences).
 Goal to achieve. They represent the state of affairs 
that maximizes benefits and minimizes costs (min-
max rule). Thus, they are selected according to the 
given set of preferences, and to the information 
collected from the environment. The goal, differently 
from preferences, is endogenous i.e. a dependant 
variable which is a function of available information 
and preferences.
 Means useful to reach goals. After the selection of 
goals a plan must be drawn. In AI means to achieve 
goals are usually called actions, and are rooted in 
capabilities. According to the prospective model, 
actions generate a cost that impacts on the net benefit 
of goals (although, costs are often not explicitly 
considered  in practical reasoning)
This decision making process is definitely the correct in 
a complex environment characterized by uncertainty. In 
such situation, according to the bounded rationality 
model (Simon 82), information is limited and its 
acquisition, such as every other possible action, 
generates a cost. That is way the major problem of such 
model is to determine when information acquisition 
must be stopped, that is, configuring the choice as 
characterized by risk (not reducible informative gap) 
rather than uncertainty (reducible informative gap). In 
other words, the reduction of uncertainty must find a 
limit in some threshold that defines the boundary
between what is the acceptable risk, and what is the 
uncertainty that needs to be managed. Such threshold, 
in economic studies, is typically called “risk 
propensity”.
In agents terms, these principles leads to a model by 
which reasoning happens according to two main 
moments: given a rule that determines whether system’s 
variations are acceptable or not, if the boundary is not 
overcome, the agent continues to commit to his current 
goal, while on the contrary, he has to revise his beliefs 
analyzing the environmental feedback in order to 
control if the plan must be changed or the goal must be 
reset. In such sense, the agent is goal autonomous. In 
bounded rationality terms, the agent “has” a risk 
propensity (the threshold) that determines the costs it is 
willing to pay (for example, in terms of decision speed) 
in order to acquire additional information and reduce 
risk. If the system’s configuration passes such risk line, 
than the agent starts to reduce uncertainty recalculating 
plans and goals that is, reformulating courses of action 
on the base of additional information. One of the main 
applications of such model is the one implemented by 
the so called BDI agents (Belief-Desire-Intentions)
(Rao and Georgeff 91).
As a corollary still derived from bounded rationality, 
achieved solutions may be local optima, given that the 
commitment to a course of action may lead to goal 
states that where not optimal if compared to those that 
would be set if more information would be available 
(that is, if the agent would be more risk taking). Of 
course, such possibility is acceptable by definition in 
practical reasoning, which exactly aims at balancing
performance with cost. In the case of the air control 
system, this is intuitively clear if we think that a 
continuous re-planning of landing schedules may keep 
in the air planes for an indefinite amount of time. In 
agents terms, goal autonomy implies that, given the 
same environment and capabilities (and implicitly, 
preferences), two agents may pursue different local 
goals according to the information they have, and 
moreover, to their risk propensity. 
In epistemological terms, the following features 
characterize environments in which agents should 
display such type of behavior (March 94):
 Objective reality: there is a reality that entails 
meaning, that is, the correct meaning of a fact “is”, in 
theory, available in the environment. As a 
consequence, partial perspectives that agents can have 
on the same environment is due to their economic or 
computational limitations in retrieving all the needed 
information.
 Cause-effect chain: events are related to each other by 
objective cause effect relations. Each event has his 
predecessors and has its own consequences. Actions 
and effects in the system are exogenously determined.
 Probability: in uncertain situations, agents can predict 
evolutions of current actions through a probability 
calculus. Agents act in a way that is consistent to such 
predictions. 
 Intentionality: decisions are tools to pursue intentions. 
In logical terms, agents perform decisions before 
acting, and actions are intended as means to achieve 
goals. 
In organizational terms, the bounded rationality 
perspective leads to consequences that are again similar 
to those postulated by current multi agent systems. On 
the one hand, since complexity is resolved as a problem 
of information processing, it is useful to create artificial 
agents able to make this in place of humans as far as 
artificial agents are more capable to store and process 
information. On the other hand, bounded information 
processing capacity leads to approach complex tasks 
through the division of decisional labor. That is, agents 
are organized in information processing organizations 
that have the exact goal to reduce information overload 
on each actor through an efficient distribution of 
information processing tasks. Borrowing from the 
classic work of Hayek (von Hayek 48), when the task is 
complex and composed of context dependant sub tasks, 
is more efficient to locally delegate its resolution while 
providing shared mechanisms of coordination. As we 
will show in the following section, from a broader 
perspective such delegation is heavily partial since it 
assumes that agents can decide on everything besides 
what they believe is desirable. That is, they freely 
decide goals and actions, while delegate to some 
designer (human, in the case of artificial agents, or 
metaphysical in the case of humans) the criterion 
through which these are considered as worth to be 
pursued.
Complexity as ambiguity
While such notion of rationality is held as normatively 
correct from an AI perspective, the evolution of 
organizational studies has heavily revised this model 
and its underlying assumptions. In fact, the definition 
above proposed does not cover entirely the concept of 
complex situations used by a growing school of 
organizational scholars (Weick 95). These scholars 
consider the concept of complexity not only in the sense 
of uncertain situations. They include the concept of 
ambiguity as a quality describing environments in 
which the meaning of things, events and objects is not 
clear.
Such environments are those where, for instance, the 
interaction mechanisms between agents are extremely 
rich (individuals may act in response of their different 
roles), where interpretations of facts are local and 
contingent, and where an entity controlling the entire 
system does not exist (Cilliers 98). Often, in these cases 
“individual elements are ignorant of the behavior of the 
whole system in which they are embedded” (Lyotard 
79). In really complex systems things happen 
simultaneously, technologies changes very frequently 
and, as stated by March, problems, solutions, 
opportunities, ideas are so much mixed that it is hard to 
interpret the connections between them (March 94).
As a consequence, ambiguous situations are those in 
which there is a lack of meaning since there is no 
sufficient information in order to formulate a unique 
frame according to which events can be interpreted and 
probabilities formulated. In such cases, an agent can 
formulate alternative and even conflicting interpretative
frames and, according to these, information can be 
interpreted in different (and plausible) ways. For 
instance, if there is either an impossibility to establish a 
unique judgment standard to compare consequences, or 
cause-effect relationships (what leads to what) are not 
so clear, different interpretations of the data are then 
available. Hence, an apparently clear situation (in 
particular from an ex-post and external perspective) can 
have more than one possible interpretation and, 
therefore, more future scenarios become plausible.
 It is important to underline that ambiguity, differently 
from uncertainty, presumes a different epistemological 
and ontological view. Here meaning, rather than lying 
in the structure of the world, resides in the structural 
coupling between the agent and the environment. 
Borrowing from constructivism (Berger and Luckman 
66), and structuration theory (Giddens 91), the actor is 
both a product and a producer of reality, that is, the 
environment constraints the agent’s behaviors while 
these are able to shape environmental constraints. From 
this perspective, ambiguity qualifies situations in which 
there “are” multiple plausible readings of the same 
context, in the sense that each reading can implement, 
through action, such possible configuration. In 
epistemological terms, knowing alternatives is neither a 
passive acquisition of information about reality 
(description) nor an idealistic production of structure 
(prescription), but rather an ongoing interaction 
between the agent and the environment. In ontological 
terms, there is not an a priori correct interpretation of 
the world, but rather a continuous accomplishment of a 
possible coupling between a decision maker and a 
decisional context. From a decision making perspective, 
while uncertainty presumes that there is an ideal 
interpretative frame (or utility function) through which 
alternatives can be ranked, ambiguity presumes that 
successful decisions are those that, because of 
interpretative framing, were able to shape a favorable
decision context1.
For our purposes it is to be underlined that, while 
uncertainty and risk assume an ontologically exogenous 
preference function, that is, a given frame of reference, 
ambiguity considers framing as endogenous to the 
decision making process. In other words, the agent 
cannot assume a given frame (such as, typically, the 
preference function or risk propensity) but rather the 
latter can be an outcome of the former. Therefore, a 
decision under ambiguity can be seen as doubled faced 
processes of interpretation (choosing a frame) and 
consequent selection of an alternative (choosing a 
course of action).
Following considerations of these scholars it is worth to 
revise the beforehand notion of complexity with other 
characteristics (March 94):
 Lack of a unique and predefined meaning of the 
environment. This implies that environmental facts 
need an interpretation. Data and feedback of the 
world are interpretable and are prone to possibly 
different explanations.
 Lack of a unique cause-effect relationship. The 
interpretability of the environment allows different 
cause-effect chains. In fact cause-effect chain changes 
according to the “point of view” used by the decision 
maker.
 Lack of intentionality: not all behaviours of agents 
are the result of a decision processes; they can be the 
consequence of rules, or the results of casual and not 
related events, etc.
While the effects of uncertainty and risk on decision 
making are well known in the AI domain, probably less 
attention has been paid on how decisions are affected by 
ambiguity.
Ambiguity and its influence on an agent’s 
reasoning model
In ambiguous situations, the normative decision making 
process is unable to provide a viable solution due to the 
lack of the necessary conditions to make a clearly and   
a priori rational choice. As Weick declares, a possible 
                                               
1
As proposed by Zack, ambiguity, equivocality, uncertainty and risk 
can be seen as logically related situations. In particular, an ambiguous 
situation (infinite interpretations) is reduced to an equivocal one 
(finite interpretations) and, within a selected frame, uncertainty is 
managed acquiring information until risk is acceptable (Zack 99).
way to face and reduce ambiguity in decision making is 
through the sensemaking process:
To talk about sensemaking is to talk about reality as 
an ongoing accomplishment that takes form when 
people make retrospective sense of the situations in 
which they find themselves. There is a strong 
reflexive quality to the process. People make sense 
of things by seeing a world on which they have 
already imposed what they believe. (Weick 95)
The concept of sensemaking contains two main logical 
moments: the retrospective process of interpretation 
(sense) and prospective one of enacting a new 
configuration of the environment (making). The starting 
assumption is that rationality, rather than being a
process aimed at keeping consequences coherent to 
preferences, is more weakly oriented towards either 
keeping coherency between consequences and 
preferences, that is, adapting the former to the latter or 
the opposite. On this regards, the concept of rationality 
is the one proposed by March of appropriateness; agents 
are aimed at matching identities (expressed, for 
example, by preferences) and situations (such as 
decisional contexts), either modifying their identities or 
the situation the face (March 94). Consequently, when 
agents face a situation that interrupts the normal flow of 
significance (a fact that generates a cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger 57)) between expected and 
manifested consequences, they need to re-establish 
appropriateness between their identities (preferences) 
and situations (consequences). If the situation they face 
is ambiguous, before taking action in order to re-
establish a correct environment (prospectively), agent
try to interpret what they have done in the past 
(retrospectively) seeking for plausible reasons and 
motivations. In fact, since there is no predefined 
meaning “attached” to facts, the sensemaking process 
has the objective to create meaning and build context to 
understand unexpected situations.
Such process needs to handle to some independent 
variable; as proposed by Weick, since preferences are 
not fixed, this handle is provided by the past. That is, 
through the observation of the past, subjects can give an 
order to current events to give them significance. As 
clearly stated by Weick, what decision makers “see” is 
heavily influenced by what they believe2, and such 
perception actively shapes the way an environment is 
understood in order to take consequent action (for 
instance the cause-effect relations or the judgment 
standard to use). From this perspective, sensing is an 
action since it’s more a process of meaning 
“imposition” rather than a mere one of meaning 
perception; it aims at acting coherently instead of 
passively contemplating.
However, the very importance of the sensemaking 
process goes beyond the simple clarification of a 
                                               
2 “Your beliefs are cause maps that you impose on the world, after 
which you see what you have already imposed.” (Weick 79)
situation. In fact, the sensemaking process influences 
what and how data is to be considered and judged by 
the subject in order to implement future actions. In this 
sense, Weick proposes the concept of enactment used to 
describe the way an agent alters and changes its 
environment through committed action (Weick 79). In 
ambiguous situations, once an interpretation is 
formulated, decision makers are able (have the 
opportunity) to enact an environment favorable to such 
interpretation. In fact, due to the ambiguity inherent the 
situation, an agent is able, through his commitment, to 
work upon the environment rather than simply adapt to 
it. In epistemological terms, once a decision maker has 
chosen an interpretative frame, he can influence and 
manipulate the environment (the reality) in order to 
establish, a posteriori, the truth conditions of his beliefs 
(self fulfilled prophecy):
In enactment, people actively construct the 
environments which they attend to by bracketing, 
rearranging, and labeling portions of the experience, 
thereby converting raw data from the environment 
into equivocal data to be interpreted. In selection, 
people choose meanings that can be imposed on the 
equivocal data by overlaying past interpretations as 
templates to the current experience. Selection 
produces an enacted environment that provides 
cause-effect explanations of what is going on. In 
retention, the organization stores the products of 
successful sensemaking (enacted or meaningful 
interpretations) so that they may be retrieved in the 
future. (Choo and Bontis 02)
Summarizing, ambiguous situations are those in which 
different feasible interpretations are ontologically 
available, allowing the decision maker, therefore, to 
pursue different future scenarios. Since each 
interpretation implies a different evaluation about the 
decision context, there is no a unique self-evident 
rational action to follow. From an ex-ante perspective, 
such evaluations are neither correct nor wrong; each 
could become “true” depending on the actions that the 
decision maker will commit to. That is, the rationality 
of a decisional behavior can be judged only a
posteriori, when consequences appear and manifest in 
the world. More precisely, when facing ambiguity, 
decision makers will implement a double-faced
cognitive strategy: at first, they adopt a retrospective 
reasoning mode in order to generate a plausible 
interpretation of the decisional context (belief-driven 
sensemaking), and, in a second moment, they commit 
their courses of action in order to enact consequences 
consistent to such evaluation (action-driven 
sensemaking). That is, they seek for an explanation of 
what they did in the past and, consequently, commit 
their future actions in order to ontologically “fix” such 
explanation in the world.
Changes of complexity management in 
organizations
Can we still talk about decisions when preferences are 
manipulated in order to justify past actions, evaluation 
standards are debatable and ill defined, cause-effect 
relationships are multiple and conflicting, consequences 
are opaque and interpretative frames intrinsically 
vague? Furthermore, if organizations are defined as 
forms to divide decisional labor, can we still talk about 
organizations?
Such view led some authors to a sort of post modernist 
criticism to the very notion of decision, stating that 
decisions are dead. In organizational terms, 
organizations are proposed as “garbage cans” in which 
solutions seek to find plausible problems, and decisions 
look for decision makers (Cohen et al. 72); moreover, 
such couplings are almost casual, often generated by the 
occasional circumstance of what issue is written on a 
meeting agenda, or which decision maker is available at 
the moment. In such sense, decisions represent our 
“western” way to celebrate modern identity, that is, the 
ideal belief that we are intentional actors aimed at 
achieving goals through the engine of rationality.  The 
step that leads to state that, if decisions are dead than 
organizations are dead, seems quite short.  Such step is 
done if we very intuitively consider organizations as 
built upon the division of decisional labor.
Interestingly, such critics have more recently given a 
chance to the survival of organizations (March 97), 
emphasizing how decisions are tools to collectively 
elaborate meaning, and celebrate a committed 
coordinated action. That is, decisions are primarily a 
moment through which organizations make sense of 
their environment and, once a plausible sense is 
produced, they build and celebrate that form of 
“collective trust” through which a socially constructive 
behavior can be sustained (Daft and Weick 84). In 
short, decisions are needed in order to sustain a 
collective faith in the successful implementation of 
retrospectively generated beliefs3.  
Such opportunity has been collected by Karl Weick and 
his concept of sensemaking, which brings the relation 
between decisions and meaning to its normative 
evaluation. In fact, it is important to note that the 
sensemaking process is not formless:
The model also implies that the greater the 
interplay between the processes of sensemaking, 
knowledge creating, and decision making, the 
greater the organization's capacity to detect 
threats and opportunities, create valuable 
knowledge, and act on new knowledge. This 
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Decision making shapes meanings even as it is shaped by them. A 
choice process provides an occasion for developing and diffusing 
interpretations of history and current conditions, as well as for mutual 
construction of theories of life. It is an occasion for defining virtue 
and truth, discovering or interpreting what is happening, what 
decision makers have been doing, and what justifies their actions. 
(March 97).
interplay is necessarily fluid and open-ended, but 
it is not entirely random or without structure.
(Choo and Bontis 02)
The sensemaking organization is the one in which 
multiple perspectives are seen as opportunities rather 
than threads, semantic redundancy is considered as a
way to promote innovative behaviors able to capture 
spaces of environmental manipulation, retrospective 
reasoning is a form of learning that aims at exploiting 
value out of failures, and evaluation standards are 
discussion objects around which new notions of what is 
virtuous rather than vicious are negotiated:
This means that we must define organization in 
terms of organizing.  Organizing consists of the 
resolving of equivocality in an enacted environment 
by means of interlocked behaviors embedded in 
conditionally related processes. To summarize these 
components in a less terse manner, organizing is 
directed toward information processing in general, 
and more specifically, toward removing 
equivocality from informational inputs. (Weick 79)
Rather than being centrally controlled and coordinated, 
agents of a sense making organization have the 
opportunity to act autonomously creating meaning of 
the environment with other entities. Furthermore, in 
contrast with the classic notion of complexity, agents do 
not only decide “how to do something” (actions) or 
“what is to be done” (goals), but rather and more 
importantly, they define “what earns to be done”
(preferences). Such process does not happen according 
to another decisional meta-level (such as a theory that 
determines preferences), but rather occurs as an 
inverted process through which, assuming actions and 
goals, an agent formulates appropriate preferences. As 
we show elsewhere (Bonifacio et al. 02), such 
apparently irrational behavior can lead to notice 
unforeseen opportunities from unexplainable failures, 
innovate the common sense notion of what is 
achievable, and discover new ways to reuse and 
combine existing capabilities.
Applications on artificial organizations
The question of whether is useful to design artificial 
systems according to a model such as the one here
proposed, finds an answer in its very definition; that is, 
are there artificial systems characterized by ambiguity? 
Are there informative environments where meanings 
are opaque, where solutions are to be constructed, and 
evaluation standards are lacking?
In order to give a response, it could be useful to 
consider how one of the main challenges in systems 
design is exactly the one of providing a clear definition 
of meaning4. Moreover, clear semantics is exactly a 
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Works on ontologies aims properly at define actors, objects and 
their relationships in a unique sense. This allows ontologies to be 
prerequisite for artificial systems to work, and the 
designer usually does such work manually and off line. 
If this is true, the questions then become whether
semantic disambiguation is needed because current 
artificial systems are able to cope only with uncertainty, 
or, on the contrary, if artificial systems that can cope 
with uncertainty are the only one needed since semantic 
disambiguation is a non problematic task. In the latter 
case, our conceptual “monster” is probably condemned 
to remain so, since it aims at managing problems that do 
not exist. In the former case, the answer is quite 
opposite; that is, our model can be seen as a plausible 
way to extend the boundary of what can be artificially 
handled while reducing the space of those tasks that are 
hand made, and thus, time consuming and imprecise.
However, that represent also moreover a qualitatively 
substantial limitation in the sense that current systems
are inflexible by definition, since each time
circumstances require a change in semantics, such 
change cannot be recomputed run time. In short, if 
semantic disambiguation and adaptability is an issue in 
artificial systems, either within the software 
environment or within the designer’s head, than current 
models are exactly unable to cope with the primary goal 
they are designed for, that is, being able to properly 
manage the complexity implied in the task. So, if 
complexity, in the sense of ambiguity, exists, than at the 
moment, rather than being fulfilled by the artificial, is 
still managed by the human.
It clearly emerges that our view leads directly to think 
about artificial agents as supporting, at run time, 
meaning generation, revision and negotiation. Such 
view may seem grounded more in fantasy rather than in 
real life. And maybe it is. But before saying so, we 
think it could be worthwhile to consider whether 
ambiguity is an issue in the design of artificial systems, 
whether is reasonable to think that ambiguity is 
managed by humans (us) as a sense making process, 
and whether is plausible that a software can be, on the 
one hand, a retrospective decision maker, and, on the 
other, a manipulator of its social environment.
Between the others, AI researches could take advantage 
in exploiting this new perspective in different
directions. First, the approach to decision making may 
be very useful to design more powerful decision making 
systems capable of recognizing different environmental 
characteristics (those related to the definition of 
ambiguity) that current systems do not consider. In 
particular planning and goal-oriented decision making 
analysis can be reconsidered to think decisions not only 
under the notion of “best response” to the environment,
but as tools to manipulate the environment.
A major consequence is that agents can be considered 
really autonomous in the sense that they are able to 
decide not only action plans and goals, but also 
evaluation criterions (such as risk propensity, 
preference functions, and interpretative frames). Such 
                                                                         
executed by software applications (Davies, Fensel, & Van Harmelen, 
2002)
feature, which is not allowed by definition in the classic 
paradigm and subsequent practical reasoning models, is 
here considered as a perfectly acceptable decisional 
momentum. Moreover, preference formulation is here 
explained as a process that can handle to past
experiences, courses of action, and sunk costs 
(Bonifacio et al. 02). This type of autonomy is, of 
course, useless in uncertain environments while in 
ambiguous ones is the only chance to maintain flexible 
behaviours.
Finally, the way in which organizational ontologies5 are 
created can be viewed as an endogenous process. 
Typically, in fact, ontologies are assumed as a premise 
for system operability. From our perspective, since 
ontologies are plausible and shared interpretations of 
the world, they can be better seen as the exact outcome 
of agents negotiating meaning in order to make sense of 
ambiguous environments.  This allows the system to be 
real-time flexible and self-adaptable since its 
components are able to question themselves about the 
reasons why they are doing what they are doing, rather 
than just doing it.
Conclusion and future work
As obvious for an explorative contribution such as this, 
the type and quantity of future work is much more than 
what can be said in a final paragraph. To some extent, 
the article itself is a proposal for future work. 
Here we briefly trace some major research lines that can 
be fruitfully explored in the near future:
 Formalize a model for sensemaking agents, providing 
primitives and reasoning methods in order to sustain 
retrospective reasoning and enacting capabilities.
 Explore the semantic dimension of AI societies, that 
is, analyze if and to what extent interpretative 
processes can be artificially implemented in order to 
sustain run time semantic disambiguation.
 Detect whether artificial systems typically face 
ambiguity, analyzing how such ambiguity is currently 
managed through existing systems and methods, 
while producing paradigmatic cases that could drive 
research and design.
Finally, we believe it could be useful to pursue a 
continuous contamination process among AI and 
organization sciences, paying attention not to filter 
those contributions of the other that seem incompatible 
with current paradigmatic assumptions. In fact, we 
frequently notice organization science concepts that 
could fruitfully provoke insights and reflections to AI 
researchers (and of course, we presume the opposite). 
Such concepts should be thrown into the other one’s 
arena, hopefully generating monsters able to capture, at 
least, fantasy and attention.
                                               
5
“ontologies are a consensual agreement on the concepts and 
relations characterizing the way in which knowledge in a domain is 
expressed” (Mentzas, 2002)
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